A large literature has analyzed verifiable information disclosure when consumers are uncertain about vertical attributes of a good. This paper complements the literature by considering uncertainty about horizontal attributes. A seller who is privately informed about the variety of the good he sells meets a buyer who is privately informed about her ideal taste for variety. Prior to a possible transaction, the seller chooses the optimal level of information to disclose about the variety. I characterize an equilibrium in which the seller fully reveals variety when the buyer's preference for her ideal taste is sufficiently strong. Otherwise, he reveals how the variety fits the expected ideal taste of the buyer. The set of fully revealed locations monotonically shrinks from all to (almost) none as the buyer's preference for her ideal taste becomes weaker. From a policy perspective, mandating full information disclosure is socially harmful.
Introduction
A large literature has analyzed how much information a privately-informed seller voluntarily reveals when consumers are unable to tell the quality of a product prior to purchase. In their seminal papers, Grossman (1981) , Grossman and Hart (1980) and Milgrom (1981) show that the seller fully reveals quality as long as there is a credible and costless means of conveying it. The primary driver of this finding is the fact that consumers' willingness-to-pay is strictly increasing in perceived quality. Therefore, a high-quality seller would always reveal its quality and distinguish itself from its own lower-quality images. As this reasoning applies to all seller types, if quality information is withheld, then it can only be the lowest-quality seller. Thus, information "unravels." Accordingly, mandatory disclosure rules are redundant because disclosure is costless and the seller voluntarily reveals the quality of the product regardless of its value.
Many goods are characterized by several attributes some of which are horizontal.
However, very little attention has been paid to verifiable information disclosure when consumers are unable to observe horizontal attributes of a good. The main objective of this paper is to characterize the extent of information disclosure and the resulting social efficiency in such environments, and compare the results with those of the quality disclosure literature. In contrast to a vertical attribute such as quality, consumers rank different varieties of a horizontal attribute differently. Geographical location of a real estate property, expertise area of a researcher or sweetness of a wine are a few examples.
It is a priori unclear to what extent the unraveling argument works, if at all, when consumer uncertainty concerns a horizontal attribute. The seller may choose to provide only partial information, thereby bringing the perceived attribute closer to the ideal taste of the average buyer. For instance, the seller of a house may choose to say in an advertisement that the house is located within a certain distance from a central square rather than revealing its exact location if the average buyer has a higher willingness-topay for a house closer to that square.
To answer these questions, I consider a simple sales encounter for a good in which there is a single seller (he) and a single buyer (she). The good is characterized by a single horizontal attribute, which I call variety. The seller is privately informed about the variety of the good while the buyer is privately informed about her ideal taste for the variety. Traditionally, markets with goods that have horizontal attributes have been analyzed using spatial models, and I continue in this tradition. Accordingly, the variety of the good and the buyer's ideal taste for it are represented by particular locations along a unit lineà la Hotelling (1929) , and the buyer strictly prefers a variety that is closer to her ideal taste. Prior to a possible transaction, the seller chooses a price and makes a report about the variety of the good. The only restriction I impose on the report is that it must be truthful. In other words, possible reports range from being very precise (revealing the exact variety) to very vague (staying silent). The buyer observes the price and the report, and responds by purchasing one unit of the good or none.
I characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which the information regarding the distance between the variety of the good and the expected ideal taste of the buyer (from the seller's point of view) fully unravels. The seller fully reveals the exact variety only when the buyer's preference for her ideal taste is sufficiently strong. Moreover, the set of fully revealed varieties monotonically shrinks (from all to (almost) none) as the buyer's preference for her ideal taste becomes weaker. Hence, information unraveling is still in effect, but not to the fullest extent.
The intuition for this finding is as follows. From the seller's point of view, the probability of a purchase is higher when the variety of the good is closer to the expected ideal taste of the buyer. When it is not sufficiently close, the seller is tempted to disclose only partial information so as to bring the buyer's perceived variety (i.e., the expected variety conditional on the report received) closer to her expected ideal taste. However, such a report leaves some uncertainty regarding the true variety. The buyer is uncertainty-averse in the sense that her willingness-to-pay would be higher had the seller made a precise report indicating the same perceived variety without any uncertainty. Thus, there are two opposing factors the seller takes into account when deciding what report to make: (i) eradicating buyer uncertainty by fully revealing the variety, and (ii) bringing the buyer's perceived variety closer to the expected ideal taste of the buyer by disclosing partial information. The buyer understands that her expected ideal taste acts as a reference point for the seller. This leads her to adopt a pessimistic posture in which she associates a partially-revealing report with the variety that is farthest away from this reference point.
Therefore, in situations when the seller discloses partial information, he never includes in his report varieties that are more distant from the expected ideal taste of the buyer than the true variety is. Since the seller employs the same strategy for all possible varieties, the distance between the true variety of the good and the expected ideal taste of the buyer fully unravels.
It may be easier to see the unraveling result with an example. As described before, the variety as well as the buyer's ideal taste are represented by locations over the unit line [0, 1] . Suppose that the expected ideal taste of the buyer is 1 2 and that, in equilibrium, the seller fully reveals the varieties in [.4, .6] and makes a report in the form [x, 1 − x] for each other variety x. Consider the case when the seller makes a report saying that the variety belongs to [.3, .7] . In this case, the buyer rationally infers that the true variety must be either .3 or .7, because the seller would not make such a report had the true variety been closer to 1 2 . Hence, the degree of mismatch between the variety and the expected ideal taste of the buyer fully unravels.
The strength of the buyer's preference for her ideal taste plays an important role in the determination of which varieties are fully revealed. When it is weak, the buyer perceives different varieties as close substitutes, so uncertainty about the variety does not lower her willingness-to-pay too much. In this case, the seller's incentive to disclose partial information is higher. Similarly, when it is strong, the seller has a higher incentive to make a precise report since uncertainty significantly lowers the buyer's willingness-topay. This relationship is monotonic in the strength of the buyer's preference for her ideal taste, and therefore, the set of fully revealed varieties expands as it becomes stronger.
Returning back to the example of disclosing the geographical location of a house, most buyers (or renters) are typically very picky for the neighborhood they want to live in, but not so much for the precise location within a neighborhood. Indeed, many house advertisements fully reveal the neighborhood the house is located in without specifying its precise location. Again, many say that the house is within a certain distance from a central location. This is in line with the predictions of this paper. Accordingly, buyers should rationally infer that the house is in fact exactly at that distance from the specified central location. Similar observations can be obtained from other markets. In classified personal advertisements (commonly known as "personals"), people typically fully reveal certain characteristics (such as gender, where they live, etc.) while presenting other characteristics in a way to make an average person in a target group (sharing similar demographics) be interested in them. For instance, in order to increase the probability of a successful match, a 60-year old, 6 5 tall man may fully reveal the city where he lives while saying that he is in the range [50, 60] in terms of age and [6 , 6 5 ] in terms of height.
Whether mandatory disclosure rules are beneficial or not has been an important question. According to the literature on quality disclosure, mandatory rules are redundant because the seller voluntarily reveals the quality of the good regardless of its value. This finding is confirmed in the current paper, too. I find that a social planner cannot improve welfare by mandating the seller to fully reveal a bigger set of varieties than the seller voluntarily does, while such a policy is often socially harmful. The intuition for this finding is as follows. The uncertainty effect typically induces the seller to charge a lower price when he reveals the distance between the variety and the expected ideal taste of the buyer compared to when he fully reveals it. Therefore, if the seller chooses to disclose partial information rather than fully revealing the variety, the expected demand he faces in the former case must be larger than the expected demand he faces in the latter. Since price is simply a transfer between the buyer and the seller, the demand enlargement effect of disclosing partial information improves total welfare. Thus, forcing the seller to fully reveal a variety that he voluntarily does not is often socially harmful.
The basic model allows several extensions. I discuss these in section 5. Most importantly, buyer uncertainty about a vertical attribute (say, quality) can easily be incorporated. In this case, the usual unraveling story applies with respect to quality disclosure.
Thus, regardless of the buyer's prior beliefs for it, quality would be fully revealed in every PBE. Accordingly, all the main results about variety disclosure remain the same.
Many authors have studied verifiable information disclosure in different contexts.
However, most of them focus on vertical attributes. Examples include Jovanovic (1982) in which information disclosure is costly; Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) who allow the seller to decide whether to acquire quality information or not; Fishman and Hagerty (1990) who analyze how much discretion a seller should be allowed in choosing how much information to disclose about quality; Shin (1994) To the best of my knowledge, Sun (2011) is the only paper that considers verifiable disclosure of horizontal attributes. In her model, a monopolist sells a good that has both horizontal and vertical attributes, and consumers are uncertain about both. However, the monopolist is constrained to choose one of the two strategies; either fully disclose both attributes or stay silent. Therefore, Sun's findings apply to situations when the seller cannot provide partial information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I introduce the basic model. In sections 3 and 4, I characterize the equilibrium level of information disclosure and investigate its social efficiency properties, respectively. In section 5, I discuss possible extensions to the main model. Finally, in section 6, I conclude. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Model
A profit-maximizing seller (S) offers a good (G) for sale which is characterized by a location over the unit interval, denoted by x ∈ [0, 1]. The location here indicates the variety of G, such as color, sweetness, etc. S is privately informed about x. I will use masculine pronouns for S and sometimes refer to x as S's type. The production costs do not depend on x, and without loss of generality, are assumed to be zero.
On the other side of the market, there is a single potential buyer (B) who has a unit demand for G. B's ideal taste, which describes the particular variety of G that she ideally wants to consume, is described by a location λ ∈ [0, 1]. This is private knowledge of B.
Similarly, I will use feminine pronouns for B and sometimes refer to λ as B's type. If B buys a unit of G at a price P , then her net utility is v − t(λ − x) 2 − P , where v is the gross utility B enjoys when the variety of G perfectly matches with her ideal taste (i.e., when x = λ) and t measures the degree of disutility B incurs when x and λ differ from each other.
2 Not buying G yields zero utility. If B buys a unit of G, then S's payoff is P . Otherwise, S gets zero payoff.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, Nature selects a value for x ∈ [0, 1] from a strictly positive density function f (x) which is symmetric around 1 2 , and a value for λ from a uniform density function defined over [0, 1] . Hence, the ex-ante expected value of both the location of G and the ideal taste of B is 1 2 . S privately observes x while B privately observes λ. After observing x, S sends a truthful and costless message M ⊂ [0, 1], and chooses a price P to which he commits thereafter. 3 In case S is indifferent between two or more messages, I assume that he sends each with a strictly positive probability. I will discuss this assumption in more detail later. B observes M and P , and then decides whether to buy G or not. Finally, the payoffs are realized. All aspects of the game are common knowledge.
It is necessary to make a few remarks about the model. First, note that B's utility function implies uncertainty-aversion with respect to x. In other words, B dislikes uncertainty about the location of G. For instance, a precise message M = for x. Second, although I assume a single buyer with a privately known ideal taste, the results are identical with a continuum of buyers whose ideal tastes are uniformly distributed over the unit line. These two specifications are equivalent. Third, B has a unit demand in my model. This is without loss of generality, because, as it will be clear later, the probability of a purchase declines with price. In other words, despite the unit demand assumption, S faces a downward-sloping expected demand function.
Fourth, I assume that S makes his reporting and pricing decisions simultaneously and that price is observed by B prior to purchase. The simultaneity assumption is not crucial;
S may make his reporting and pricing decisions in any order. However, it is crucial that B observes the price prior to purchase and S commits to the price he chooses. Finally, in line with the quality disclosure literature, I focus on truthful and costless messages.
The location of the good, x, is exogenously given in this paper. However, it is possible to allow S to influence it. Consider a production process in which the choice of location is subject to an error. For instance, sweetness of a wine crucially depends on the climate which is difficult to predict beforehand. In this scenario, S chooses a target location for 
, p is the price that maximizes S's expected revenue when he sends a message M :
, m is the message that maximizes S's expected revenue subject to x ∈ m:
(D.4) Let Ω describe the set of locations that induce S to send a message M and choose a price P , i.e., Ω = {x | m = M , p = P }. Then, for all M and P such that Ω = ∅, B updates her beliefs in the following way:
(D.1) states that, for any observed message M and price P , B decides to buy a unit of G only if, given her updated beliefs, her expected net utility is non-negative. S rationally anticipates B's best response to any given M and P , and chooses the best price and message that maximize his expected revenue, 
Equilibrium information disclosure
In this section, I investigate the properties of equilibrium information disclosure. I first describe B's optimal behavior for a given message and price. I then describe the optimal message and the price S chooses for each x, taking B's optimal behavior given. The main result is stated in Proposition 2 which provides a description of equilibrium information disclosure.
B's optimal behavior is summarized by (D.1) and (D.4). Given a message M and a price P , she updates her beliefs about x, as described in (D.4), and buys G if and only if her net expected surplus from buying is non-negative, as described in (D.1). Thus,
where Ω is, as described in (D.4), the set of locations that induce S to send a message M and choose a price P . Solving expression (5) for λ yields
where λ L (λ H ) is the lowest (highest) type of B that buys G when S sends a message M and chooses a price P .
S takes B's optimal buying behavior as given and maximizes his expected revenue.
Since S is uncertain about λ, the price he chooses for a given M maximizes the expected
expected demand is simply the probability that λ lies between λ L and λ H . Since S's priors for λ are uniform over [0, 1], the expected demand S faces is given by
As mentioned in the previous section, t measures how strong B's preference for her ideal taste is, and v can be interpreted as the quality of G. When t is high, a mismatch between the variety of G and B's ideal taste reduces B's willingness-to-pay badly. Similarly, when v is high, consumption of G offers a high utility. Therefore, the expected demand S faces at a given price is increasing in the value of
Analyzing the expected demand function, D(P ; x, v, t), leads to two important observations. On the one hand, S wants to bring the perceived location of
as close to the expected ideal taste of B (which is , not equal to 0 and 1, respectively), a higher uncertainty lowers the expected demand. These two factors work against each other, so S's optimal decision depends on which factor dominates.
First, consider the situation when x is commonly known (or, equivalently, when S fully reveals it). Letting a subscript 1 indicate this situation, equations (6) and (7) reduce to
Let p 1 and R 1 denote, for a given (v, t), the optimal price S chooses and the resulting equilibrium expected revenue he makes when x is known. For a given location x, the revenue-maximizing price is
which leads to equilibrium expected revenue S makes
, constant for
and strictly decreasing for min
From S's point of view, the likelihood B buys G is higher the closer the location of G is to the expected ideal taste of B. That is why the revenue S expects under full location information increases as x gets closer to and max
. Therefore, for these locations, S is effectively unconstrained and is able to achieve the highest revenue he can. When
x is closer to the edges, on the other hand, either λ . 4 The equilibrium value of p 1 for all (x, v, t) can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 has an important implication: when B is uncertain about x, S's optimal information disclosure strategy calls for fully revealing all locations min
. This is because doing so leads to a revenue of R 1 ( This observation plays a key role in the characterization of equilibrium information disclosure. Suppose that S fully reveals the locations that lie in (z, 1 − z) in equilibrium and consider the case when x = z. S knows that, regardless of the message he sends, B will never assign a positive probability to the values of x between z and 1 − z because S would normally fully reveal these locations. In other words, the usual unraveling story is at work here. In case S chooses not to fully reveal x = z, his problem is to choose a message that brings the perceived location as close to 1 2 as possible while keeping uncertainty as low as possible. Since f (x) is symmetric around 1 2 , S can induce a perceived location of exactly , while sending a partially-revealing message for the rest.
It is important to note that there are many messages that lead to the same equilibrium inference is Ω = {z, 1 − z} where she assigns equal probability to each possibility. 5 So,
and thus equations (6) and (7) reduce to
Expressing these expressions for a generic x, the revenue-maximizing price is
where
. This leads to the equilibrium expected revenue S makes
A comparison of R 1 and R 0 yields the set of locations that are fully revealed in equilibrium. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 1 for v = 0.6 and t = 1. The horizontal axis indicates the values of x. The solid curve is the expected revenue S earns when x is fully revealed, R 1 , while the dashed curve is the expected revenue he earns when he sends a partially-revealing message, R 0 . As seen in the figure, a set of central locations
is fully revealed because, as described earlier, S can achieve a revenue of R 1 ( , as x gets 5 Note that Bayes' rule does not work since both are ex-ante zero-probability events. In this case, updating proceeds as follows:
.
Using l'Hôpital's rule,
6 The equilibrium value of p 0 for all (x, v, t) can be found in Appendix A.
13
more distant from 1 2 , λ L 1 becomes binding in case S fully reveals x, so S prefers sending a partially-revealing message. The adverse effect of uncertainty is minimal for locations close to 1 2 but increases quickly as the true location gets closer to the edges. Therefore, the locations below x L (symmetrically those above 1 − x L ) are also fully revealed. Holding v constant, for lower (higher) values of t, both curves in Figure 1 shift upwards (downwards). The magnitude of the shift is higher for R 0 compared to R 1 . Therefore, the set of fully revealed locations shrinks (grows). In other words, x H increases (decreases) while x L decreases (increases) as , while sending a partiallyrevealing message for the remaining locations.
Social Planner's Problem
In this section, I analyze the social welfare properties of equilibrium information disclosure. I focus attention on policies in which a social planner may mandate S to fully reveal a given set of locations. 7 When full disclosure is not mandatory for a particular location
x, S may choose to fully reveal it or send a partially-revealing message as described in the previous section (i.e., pool it with 1 − x). Thus, if the total expected welfare (S's revenue plus B's net utility) evaluated under full disclosure is higher than the expected welfare evaluated under a partially-revealing message for a particular location x, then the social planner mandates S to fully reveal it (unless S voluntarily does so).
Even though the classical information disclosure literature typically finds excessive information disclosure, this finding critically depends on the assumption that consumers have unit demands with identical reservations prices. In this case, since disclosure does not change equilibrium demand, it is purely redistributive. In the current model, on the other hand, the expected demand S faces is downward-sloping. Although S charges a higher price under full location information, B makes a better-informed decision. So, while it is clear that S's expected revenue goes down by mandating him to fully reveal a location which he would normally not reveal, B's net expected utility may increase.
Therefore, it is a priori unclear whether there is any need for intervention. . Thus, the total expected welfare when the true location is x and is fully revealed, W 1 , can be expressed as
Note that price is simply a transfer between S and B, so the total expected welfare is equal to the gross expected utility of B. Similarly, when S sends a partially-revealing message, he chooses a price p 0 and B buys G if her location is at most
The first-best is to set the price equal to the marginal cost of production (which is 0) and force S to fully reveal the variety at all times. 8 If disclosure is sufficiently costly, a monopoly seller may under-provide full quality information when demand is downward-sloping. See Daughety and Reinganum (2008) and Celik (2011) for further details. units away from 1 2 . The total expected welfare in this case is
If W 1 > W 0 for some x for which R 1 < R 0 (so that S normally sends a partiallyrevealing message), then the social planner mandates S to fully reveal it. Proposition 3 establishes that there is actually no value of x for which this is true.
Proposition 3 Mandating S to fully reveal a location does not improve social welfare, while it is often socially harmful.
The intuition for this finding is as follows. Compared to full disclosure, sending a partially-revealing message leaves B with some uncertainty regarding the true location of G. This typically induces S to charge a lower price. Therefore, if S chooses to send a partially-revealing message rather than a fully-revealing one, the expected demand he faces in the former case must be larger than the expected demand he faces in the latter. Since price is simply a transfer, the demand enlargement effect of disclosing partial information improves the total welfare. Thus, forcing S to fully reveal a variety that he voluntarily does not is often socially harmful.
Discussion
In this section, I discuss several points related to possible extensions of the model. The first point regards incorporating uncertainty about quality. As noted before, the parameter v can be interpreted as the quality of the good. If the buyer is also uncertain about the quality, it can easily be shown that the seller's expected revenue is strictly increasing in the perceived quality of the buyer. This is true even when the seller is assumed to be uncertain about the buyer's taste for quality. 9 Thus, regardless of her prior beliefs for it, quality would be fully revealed in every PBE. In other words, the usual unraveling story applies with respect to quality disclosure. Accordingly, all of the main results about location disclosure remain valid.
Second, I have considered a general message technology whereby the seller could send any message that includes the true location of the good. If the seller is somehow constrained to either fully reveal the location or stay silent, then the structure of equilibrium information disclosure substantially changes. When the buyer's preference for her ideal taste is sufficiently strong, the seller fully reveals all locations. When it is weak, the seller fully reveals a set of central locations while staying silent for the remaining ones.
Depending on the shape of the buyer's prior beliefs, there may be multiple PBE. In this case, each PBE is characterized with a different set of fully revealed locations. The set of fully revealed locations shrinks in every PBE as the buyer's preference for her ideal taste becomes weaker, but is always non-empty. Sun (2011) is sufficiently large) so that the indifferent buyer is either λ = 0 or λ = 1 (or both). In this case, all messages that lead to the same perceived location are equivalent from the indifferent buyer's point of view. Therefore, the seller chooses any (truthful) partially-revealing message that leads to a perceived location of 1 2 , thereby achieving the same expected revenue as he would achieve when
. As a result, there are many possible equilibria which are payoff-equivalent for the seller, but are substantially different in terms of the buyer's equilibrium inferences. (2008) and Celik (2011) for a similar result in a quality-disclosure framework when the seller faces a downward-sloping demand.
A final point is about the prior beliefs of the buyer about the location of the good.
Even though I have assumed that the prior beliefs are symmetric around 1 2 , the class of PBE described in Proposition 2 is valid for any prior beliefs. Consider the following off-equilibrium beliefs. When the seller includes many locations in his message, the buyer associates the good with the location that is farthest away from 1 2 . In case there are two such locations, the buyer assigns a positive probability to both. 10 Under these beliefs, the seller never sends a message that includes locations farther away from the center than the good's true location. Therefore, the class of PBE described in Proposition 2 remains valid. However, it is generally not the unique PBE. Unless f (x) is symmetric around 1 2 , sending a partially-revealing message as described in Proposition 2 does not lead to a perceived location of 1 2 . As such, the seller may choose to send a message that would bring the perceived location closer to 1 2 unless the adverse effect of uncertainty is too high.
Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the level of information a privately-informed monopoly seller voluntarily reveals about the horizontal attribute of the good he sells. The horizontal 10 There is an exception for messages such that M ⊂ attribute is captured by a location over the unit line. I consider a single buyer with a privately known ideal taste which is also captured by a location (although the findings would be the same if there is a continuum of buyers with different ideal tastes). Although information unraveling does not apply to the fullest extent, it is still at work. I characterize an equilibrium in which the degree of mismatch between the true location of the good and the expected ideal taste of the buyer fully unravels. The driving force for this finding is the (optimal) skepticism of the buyer; any partially-revealing message induces her to believe that the true location of the good is the one in the message that is farthest away from her expected ideal taste. The seller fully reveals the true location only when the buyer's preference for her ideal taste is sufficiently strong. As it becomes weaker, the set of fully revealed locations monotonically shrinks and when it is sufficiently weak, the seller fully reveals only the location that corresponds to the expected ideal taste of the buyer.
From a social point of view, I find that it is never welfare-improving, but is often socially harmful, to mandate the seller to fully reveal a location that he voluntarily does not. The reason for this finding is the demand enlargement effect of a partially-revealing message whereby the seller typically charges a lower price compared to what he would charge under full disclosure. This is in line with the classical information disclosure literature which also finds excessive disclosure.
I have assumed that horizontal attributes of a good can be described by a single location. Future work may consider multiple horizontal and vertical attributes and analyze the incentives of a monopoly seller to provide information on multiple dimensions.
Moreover, such an extension would enable an empirical test of the model. An example is the market for real estate where there is typically a limited number of characteristics sellers may reveal in advertisements.
Appendix A: Equilibrium price
In this part of the appendix, I derive the equilibrium price S chooses under the two possible scenarios: when S fully reveals x and when he sends a partially-revealing message.
This will later be helpful in the proofs of propositions. Note that since S's beliefs for λ are uniform over [0, 1] , the probability B buys G at a given price is symmetric around 1 2 with respect to x. So, it will be sufficient to characterize equilibrium price for x ≤ 1 2 only.
Case 1 When S fully reveals x
Since S's beliefs for λ are uniform over [0, 1] , the probability B buys G at some given price is symmetric around 1 2 with respect to x. So, it will be sufficient to characterize equilibrium price for x ≤ 1 2 only. By equations (6) and (7), for a given (P, v, t), if S chooses a price such that
, then
If, on the other hand,
Finally, when . Checking for corner solutions leads to the following equilibrium price (tedious but otherwise straightforward algebra).
• If
Note that p 1 is non-monotonic in x (as x goes from 0 to 1 2 ). For
, when x is sufficiently close to 0, S prefers to keep the price low in order to increase the probability of a purchase, thereby leaving a positive surplus to the λ = 0 type B. So, in this region, S effectively chooses the highest type of B that he wants to serve. Therefore, as x gets closer to 1 2 , the price S optimally sets increases. When
, it becomes optimal to make λ = 0 type B indifferent between buying and not. Therefore, the equilibrium price is decreasing in this region. When
on the other hand, the real question S faces is whether to sell or not to the λ = 1 type B. This particular buyer type is willing to pay more for values of x closer to 1. Therefore, the equilibrium price is increasing over x ∈ 0,
is large.
Case 2 When S sends a partially-revealing message
When S sends a partially-revealing message, say M = [x, 1 − x], B infers that the true variety must be either x or 1 − x. Hence, when S charges a price P , equations (6) and (7) reduce to
For a given (P, v, t), if S chooses a price such that
Similarly, if
Finally, when
, all types of B buy G, so D 0 (P ; x, v, t) = 1. Maximizing P D 0 (P ; x, v, t), with respect to P leads to the following equilibrium price (when the expected demand equals 0 for any P ≥ 0, I assume that the equilibrium price is 0).
, for all x ≤ 1 2 .
In this scenario, when v t is small, S cannot generate any demand for G unless it is located sufficiently close to 1 2 . So, in this case, the choice of price is random. I assume, for simplicity, that S charges a price of 0 in such a case. In all other cases, p 0 is strictly positive and it strictly increases as x gets closer to 
Appendix B: Proofs of the Propositions
In this part of the appendix, I present the proofs. As before, I will consider only the values of x over 0, 1 2 unless otherwise noted.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using Envelope Theorem, over the values of x for which
, so , it happens for max 0, 2
in which case S charges a price p 1 = t v t − (1 − x) 2 and serves all types of B (since
2 . This is again strictly increasing in x. Finally,
, S charges a price
and faces an expected demand
. Hence, the revenue R 1 = for which R 0 < R 1 for all x and for which R 0 > R 1 for all x. This concludes the proof.
Before proceeding, I make the following two important observations. First, if two messages lead to the same perceived location, S strictly chooses the message associated with a lower implied variance. Formally, suppose there are two messages M and M such
. Then, M leads to a strictly higher expected revenue than M . Second, off-equilibrium beliefs cannot be randomly chosen in verifiable disclosure games. After observing an off-equilibrium message, B will not assign a positive probability to any x ∈ M . For example, if S unexpectedly fully reveals x, then B believes S because lying is ruled out.
so that the region
is non-empty. By Proposition 1, this is where the expected revenue S earns is constant and is equal to , v, t . For
, by Proposition 1, R 1 (x, v, t) is strictly increasing in x. Given that S fully
, then it is best for S to either fully reveal x or reveal ).
The latter strategy is associated with the lowest variance among all possible inferences S may induce B to make. This is because pooling with locations that are farther away from 1 2 than the good's true location simply raises V ar
The only complication may arise with extreme off-equilibrium beliefs. Suppose after observing a partially-revealing message, B assigns a probability of 1 to the location that is farthest away from 1 2 . In case there are two such locations, assume that B assigns a probability of 1 to the location that is higher than 1 2 . Under these beliefs, S is indifferent between sending any message M ⊂ v 3t
, because any such message leads to an expected revenue of R 1 1 2
, v, t . Remember that I assumed, in case S is indifferent between two or more messages, he sends each with a strictly positive probability. Hence, under the described beliefs, S may choose a partiallyrevealing message for
with a positive probability, which induces B to misinterpret the true location. Thus, these extreme off-equilibrium beliefs cannot be part of a PBE for
. An example of consistent off-equilibrium beliefs upon
is believing the message as it is. Since this introduces a positive variance, S would never deviate.
Similarly, these extreme off-equilibrium beliefs cannot be part of a PBE for x < and suppose that S is indifferent between fully revealing x and revealing 1 2 − x . But then, even under the extreme off-equilibrium beliefs described above, S chooses the latter strategy with a positive probability. Hence, B's inference would again be inconsistent. This means that, when B observes a partially-
, she assigns a probability of 1 to the location that is farthest away from 1 2 , but in case there are two such locations, she must assign a positive probability to both of them.
, R 1 (x, v, t) is strictly increasing in x for all x ≤ demand. The second lemma shows that whenever a partially-revealing message is more profitable than fully revealing x, the expected demand under the former is at least as large as the one under latter. Before proceeding with the lemmas, note from equations (6) and (7) that, under both strategies, price enters the expected demand function as
Moreover, the equilibrium prices I find in Appendix A are multiples of t. Thus, both . Hence,
3/2 , and thus, (12) and (13),
2 )dλ. ), full disclosure is welfare superior to sending a partially-revealing message. However, since S voluntarily reveals all x for these parameter values, there is no need for mandating full disclosure.
For the remainder of the proof, I will focus on the remaining situations (i.e., In this case, if S sends a partially-revealing message for x, the resulting consumer surplus is expressed as
Again, mandating S to fully reveal x in situations when he voluntarily does not is socially harmful. . In this region, R 1 > R 0 for all x (except for x = 1 2
where two regimes are equivalent). So, mandatory disclosure rules are unnecessary.
